Biography
I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at Northwestern University. My interests are in the fields of Industrial Organization and Applied Econometrics.
I will be on the 2023/2024 job market.
Working Papers
Abstract:
We study the equilibrium effects of tobacco control policies. To accurately assess the
impact of tobacco regulation on consumption, it is essential to understand how firms
respond. We highlight that consumers' dependence on cigarettes, which we refer to as
consumer inertia, introduces dynamic incentives for firms. Thus, we develop a
dynamic oligopoly model and estimate it using product-level data and a panel of smokers.
Leveraging large tax fluctuations and a policy that forced approximately 40% of products
out of the market, we show that consumers have significant addiction and brand loyalty. We
then propose a tractable equilibrium notion to compute market outcomes and show that dynamic
competition models under inertia capture firm behavior well. We use this framework to
examine the counterfactual effect of uniform packaging restrictions and caps on nicotine
concentration. We highlight that firms' price and portfolio responses account for a
substantial part of the overall policy effect. Moreover, we stress that more simplistic
models of static competition would have led to significantly different conclusions about
expected companies' responses.
Abstract:
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have the potential to correct market failures, but they are
also subject to the influence of politics and interest groups. We examine this trade-off in
the context of the nationalization of the leading gasoline company in Argentina. Descriptive
analysis suggests that pricing patterns changed after the nationalization. First, the
government exerted less market power, charging lower prices on average and benefiting
consumers. Second, it engaged in less economic price discrimination, reducing the correlation
between prices and consumers' willingness to pay. Third, it engaged in political price
discrimination, charging lower prices in provinces with political connections with the
state-owned firm. Motivated by these findings, we develop and estimate a model of gasoline
supply and demand under market power and recover the government's objective function. We
find that public provision lead to welfare gains but is also associated with redistributive
motives. Compared to a benevolent planner that internalizes the welfare of all consumers
and firms equally, the government set prices as if it only cares about favoring middle-income
consumers and consumers in provinces that have political ties with the firm. Lastly, we use
the model to assess the company's response to policy alternatives, including pricing rules
that align government actions with the public interest and are in place in government
agencies worldwide. Our findings show that rules effectively reduce the influence of
politics in pricing but are associated with higher costs: they mitigate half of the welfare
gains generated by the nationalization and increase the taxpayers' burden by 10%. These
findings emphasize the importance of politics and interest groups in shaping governments'
decision-making process and the role of SOEs as instruments for redistribution.
Abstract:
In many economic settings, counterfactual analysis can be difficult for two reasons: (i) we
do not know how to compute the equilibrium of the game, or (ii) even if we know how to
compute one equilibrium, the game might feature multiple equilibria, which are challenging
to characterize exhaustively. We propose a bounding framework to allow for counterfactual
analysis even when these problems might arise. The method relies on determining valid
(conservative) bounds to counterfactual outcomes that contain any outcome that could be
sustained in equilibrium, i.e., any outcome that can be supported by a set of equilibrium
constraints. To ensure that all potential solutions are considered, We propose to reframe
equilibrium constraints as a relaxed mixed-integer linear program. We show that the
framework can also be used to narrow down equilibria by imposing additional equilibrium
constraints. We provide examples of static price competition with differentiated products,
dynamic games, and multi-unit auctions, three areas where counterfactual analysis faces
these challenges.
Work in Progress
Dynamic Equilibrium Effects of Sin Taxes for Addictive Products
Misallocation of water. The role of storage
,
Insurance under information frictions in the electricity market
,